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Abstract
Evolution of the ¯rms' investment behaviour is interpreted by heterodox theories
as the resultant of the ¯nancialisation of the accumulation regime. The French School
of Regulation speaks thus about patrimonial capitalism. Strategies of productive and
¯nancial investments, and the way of ¯nancing such activities, respond to increased
shareholder requirements about the return of the invested funds. In order to check
these assumptions, tests on panel data are carried out starting from a sample on great
French groups, quoted on the SBF 250 Index.
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The econometric tests about the determinants of the companies' investments are nu-
merous, in particular for tests based on national accounting data. With regard to works
on panel data, many are those bearing on estimates of the relation between cash-°ow and
investment, based on neo-Keynesian assumptions of asymmetrical information and agency
costs (cf. Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen [1988]; Mairesse, Hall & Mulkay [2001]; Carpenter
& Guariglia [2008]). The aim of this paper is to bring new perspectives on ¯nancial and
productive investment decisions of the large ¯rms within the framework of ¯nancialised
capitalism (Aglietta & Breton [2001]; Boyer [2001]; Aglietta & Reb¶ erioux [2004]), and on
his ¯nancing way, resorting to data of group accounting over the 1989-2007 period (SBF
250 - Worldscope Base). This work follows a previous one with VECM modeling, carried
out primarily on the basis of post-Keynesian assumption (cf. Godley & Lavoie, 2001-2002),
but from national accounting data (Cl¶ evenot, Guy & Mazier, 2008).
The main lesson is the following one. First of all, we highlight a negative link between
investment and ¯nancial pro¯tability of the ¯rms, as clari¯ed by du Tertre & Guy (2008)
starting from descriptive statistics relating to the same data. The ¯nancial investment
(except Merger and Acquisition since the data are consolidated) does not enter directly
in competition with productive investment, and rests mainly on leverage e®ect objectives
and on return of the corresponding ¯nancial investments. The debt of the ¯rms is also
explained in particular by the pursuit of ¯nancial leverage e®ect. Lastly, it is the ¯nancing
of external growth which seems to justify the shares issuance (cf. Toporowski [2000]).
1 Financialisation of ¯rm's strategies: investments and ¯-
nancing





































9Kalecki's one, which establishes a positive link between productive investment and the
increase in the rate of pro¯t (Kalecki 1937, 1954). The principle of this pro¯t accelerator
is the following one: when the pro¯ts increase, some previously non-pro¯table investment
plans become pro¯table. More recent theoretical models (Taylor 1985) introduce the rate
of capacity utilisation, in order to test at the same time the pro¯ts and sales expecta-






K¡1 = rate of accumulation, I = Productive investment, K = stock of productive
capital, R = P
K¡1, P = gross pro¯t and U = Rate of capacity utilisation.
However, the macroeconomic report (Cl¶ evenot, Guy & Mazier, 2008) of a clear discon-
nection between pro¯t and investment over the two last decades has led in wondering about
the possibility of a new impact of ¯nance on investment, and in particular for the great
quoted groups. The question of the link between ¯nance and investment was discussed
many times. This link was ¯rst rejected by Modigliani and Miller (1958). However, the
growing importance of the ¯nancial management of the ¯rms' balance sheet tends to show
the opposite. This theorem is however based on the assumption of perfect information,
which will be called into question thereafter by the neo-Keynesian school in particular
(Tobin & Brainard, 1968).
The theory of Tobin's Q, which remains based on this assumption of perfect informa-
tion, supposes that ¯rms arbitrate between productive investment and ¯nancial invest-
ment. This ratio reports the ¯nancial value of the ¯rm to the value of its physical capital.
There is then a positive relation between Tobin's Q ratio and productive investment. How-
ever, the empirical veri¯cations are not very conclusive (cf. Ashworth & Davis, 2001). The
assumption of an opposition between ¯nancial and productive investment poses actually a
problem. E®ectively, the determinants of these two behaviours are mainly the same ones.
In order to study the links between ¯nance and investment, we then resort to the post-





































9a ¯rm takes risks more and more as it is involved in debt. Also, a negative link between










P = solvency ratio. Given the theoretical di±culties raised above, the introduction
of a Tobin's Q ratio seems problematic. Some post-Keynesian authors have recourse to it
(Davidson 1972; Godley & Lavoie 2001-2002), which is not the case in this paper.
The main reference in terms of links between ¯nance and investment corresponds here
to Minsky's work on the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH, cf. Minsky 1986). Accord-
ing to this reasoning, in a ¯nancialised economy, the ¯nancial risk increases as the economy
grows in period of strong expansion. One period of innovation implies an acceleration of
investment. The increase in pro¯ts validates the investment plans and led to a rise in
debt. The stock exchange valorisation of the ¯rms is consequently reinforced, because of
the leverage e®ect recourse. However, since pro¯t expectations are reversed, whatever are
the reasons, the illiquidity of the ¯nancial markets can induce an insolvency of the most
speculative ¯rms (Brossard 1998). These works can be connected to Aglietta's ones (2003).
According to this last, three factors of ¯nancial fragility are combined today: a ¯nancial
convention validating expectations of increasing pro¯ts, a reinforcement of the recourse
to leverage e®ect, and myopia about the level of taken risk. During expansion periods,
not only the operations of internal growth increase but also the operations of external
growth (Mergers and Acquisitions). Indeed, this makes it possible for the ¯rms to ful¯l
more quickly the requirements of return by shareholder through leverage e®ect, and can
explain the disconnection between productive investment and the rate of pro¯t.
In order to test a negative impact of a ¯nancial pro¯tability norm which would be
imposed on companies, we introduce the ROE (Return On Equity) into our equations, in
the way of Boyer (2000). With the di®erence of Stockhammer (2004) or Van Treeck (2008),
we do not use ratios relating to ¯nancial expenses, because the dividends in particular do





































9Moreover, these studies do not take into account ¯nancial pro¯tability, which however
seems the key variable on which the investors focus (Orl¶ ean, 1999; Aglietta & Breton,
2001) in order to make sure of a management of the ¯rm to their advantage. To ¯nish, the







With ROE = ¯nancial pro¯tability (return on equity, net income divided by common
stock).
Concerning the ¯nancial investment, as explained above and starting from work of
Aglietta (2003), the valorisation of the ¯nancial assets rests mainly today on external
growth projects, based on a strong ¯nancial leverage. Thus, the development of Mergers
and Acquisitions operations or of share buybacks shows how the groups became fully actors
on ¯nancial markets (Plihon, 2002). However, in the group accounts used here, when a
majority stake is acquired by companies, this stake is consolidated, as we will see later.
Also, ¯nancial accumulation could be tested only through the acquiring of minority stakes
(Ee). The behaviour of ¯nancial investment will be studied through the supposed positive
role of the ¯nancial pro¯tability requirements, but also by the positive role of the debt ratio
directly expressing the recourse to the debt leverage. Interest rate is also introduced and
can express two phenomena: a traditional negative e®ect of ¯nancing cost of investment,





With ¢Ee = Financial accumulation and r apparent interest rate.
Considering theoretical assumptions relating to the investment behaviours mentioned
above, the analysis of indebtedness is initially made through the recourse to a ¯rst ap-
proach, that of indebtedness norm. According to this analysis (Aglietta & Breton, 2001),
the companies arbitrate between a high debt necessary to ful¯l the shareholder require-





































9the risks of insolvency. Also, interest rate will play a negative role and the ¯nancial prof-
itability a positive one as an indicator of the convention of return established on ¯nancial
markets. The theoretical equation also conforms to a second approach of credit demand
and supply such as de¯ned in various models of which that of Taylor (2004). The credit
demand depends indeed negatively on the interest rate and positively on the demand for










Lastly, several kinds of equations are proposed about the issues of shares: a simple
proportional link between productive investment and share issuance (Godley & Lavoie
[2001-2002]; Taylor [2004]); a constant ratio between the volume of issued equities and
the stock of ¯xed assets (Dos Santos & Zezza, 2004) corresponding to the neo-Keynesian
principle of equity rationing. We propose here an alternative speci¯cation. Given the ¯rms'
need for conforming to the shareholder requirements through the ¯nancialisation of their
strategies as explained above, the assumption according to which these projects are often
¯nanced by the quoted groups on the basis of share issuance will be tested (cf. Toporowski
[2000]; Lordon [2008]).
More precisely, the ¯rms undergo a ¯nancial constraint which can be described by the
term of "good practices of management" (Batsch, 2006): to reach the norms of ¯nancial
return expected by the markets, they become particularly demanding on the level of return
on their investments, and make sure to maximize the redistribution of cash-°ow to the
shareholders, in particular by a rigorous control of invested capital. Thus, in growth period,
the ¯rms would be incited to arbitrate between the maximization of the ¯nancial leverage
e®ect as explained above, and the issuance of equities. This is done in order on the one
hand to guarantee the solvency of the ¯rms and on the other hand to obtain su±cient
funds to throw into investments projects and in particular into Merger and Acquisition





































9groups would tend on the contrary to limit their equity issuance, so that the cash-°ow
remaining after the repayment of a part of the debt will be focused on a few shareholders.






With FA = Financial investment in operations of Mergers and Acquisitions.
2 Methodology and Tested Equations
The basic equations which will be tested are the following ones. First of all, concerning
the productive investment, we start from this speci¯cation:
¢Log Kc = a0 + a1¢Log P + a2
L¡1
P
+ a3¢Log r + a4¢Log ROE (7)
With Kc productive capital; P gross pro¯t; solvency ratio (L net ¯nancial debt), r appar-
ent nominal interest rate and ROE ¯nancial pro¯tability. It is thus, as explained above, a
pro¯t-accelerator type of investment equation a la Kalecki (1954).
Then, the following equation is tested for ¯nancial investment.




With Ee ¯nancial assets held (of which minority interests) and L
L+OF debt ratio.
The equation (8) makes it possible to the test role which the trend of the apparent interest
rate plays on ¯nancial investment through an arbitrage between ¯nancial assets, or as
¯nancing cost of investment. The debt ratio and the ¯nancial pro¯tability are introduced
to test the hypothesis about ¯nancial leverage e®ect. The coe±cients are expected positive.
The debt ratio in the equation (9) allows highlighting the same phenomenon. The equation
of debt has the following form:
L
OF




With debt ratio (debt leverage stricto sensu), and K productive capital (tangible and in-





































9pro¯tability and the indebtedness, in order to support the assumption according to which
the research of higher ¯nancial pro¯tability leads the ¯rms to increase their debt, here
again in order to activate the ¯nancial leverage e®ect.
Lastly, the issues of shares will be estimated starting from this speci¯cation:




With Ki intangible capital and L
K¡1 indebtedness ratio. We postulate here that the aim
of the share issuances is mainly to ¯nance Mergers and Acquisitions. To highlight this
phenomenon, we test the signi¯cativity of the link between intangible capital and equity
issuing.
The various equations presented above can then be rewritten in the more general shape
of panel equations. This gives as follows:
yij = ®Xit + vi + vt + eit (11)
With i the corresponding individual or ¯rm, T the period, y the explained variable for each
equation (7) to (10), X the whole of the explanatory variables, vi individual ¯xed e®ect, vt
a temporal e®ect and eit the error term. We then have recourse to a Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator in ¯rst di®erence. This makes it possible to eliminate the
¯xed individual e®ects. One then obtains the next global equation in ¯rst di®erence:
With i the corresponding individual or ¯rm, T the period, y the explained variable for
each equation (7) to (10), X the whole of the explanatory variables, vi individual ¯xed
e®ect, vt a temporal e®ect and eit the error term. We then have recourse to a General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in ¯rst di®erence. This makes it possible to
eliminate the ¯xed individual e®ects. One then obtains the next global equation in ¯rst
di®erence:
¢yij = ®¢Xit + ¢vt + ¢eit (12)
One can then instrument the explanatory variables of the equation (12) by their level





































9chosen here, supposed slightly exogenous, are instrumented by their values lagged once or
more. To then ensure models validity, two tests are used. These ones correspond to the
second-order serial correlation of Arellano & Bond (m2 test) and of the Hansen test for
the validity of the lagged variables used as instruments (J-test).
For all speci¯cations, sectorial dummies are introduced in order to test the possible
presence of sectorial e®ects and the robustness of the estimations. The 8 sectors tested
corresponds to the SIC classi¯cation1 (Standard Industrial Classi¯cation) disposable in
Worldscope Database, except of course of the ¯nancial sector because of the composition
of the sample. The chosen reference sector is Mining Industry (SIC 1).
3 Main Characteristics of the Data and Descriptive Statis-
tics
The data used here result from the Worldscope database (Thomson Financial). These
are data of group accounts, which are great non-¯nancial groups quote on the French SBF
250 Index at the end of 2008. We however excluded France Telecom and Vivendi from the
sample after a descriptive analysis of the data. Indeed, the evolution of the debt of these
two groups tends to distort the global analysis which arises from the remainder of the
sample. This last ¯nally consist of 215 ¯rms, relates to the 1989-2007 period, and is not
balanced. The tests are carried out starting from the software Stata 10.0, which is able
to manage unbalanced panels2. In order to exclude uncommon shocks, very occasional,
and speci¯c to few ¯rms, we eliminate on a case-by-case basis some data considered as
not very signi¯cant in our sample. Indeed, three main issues can arise. First of all, the
gross pro¯t P can in some cases so strongly fall that one will have for example a sol-
vency
L¡1
P extremely high and thus not very signi¯cant for the overall analysis. Then, one
can have equity capital in freefall over one year, because of an exceptionally negative net
income. One consequence in particular may be a ¯nancial pro¯tability ratio abnormally
1See sectors' names and corresponding label in the Annex.





































9high. Lastly, the debt of the ¯rms is a net ¯nancial debt, i.e. decreased of the short-term
investments, according to the admitted de¯nition of the total debt in functional balance-
sheet (Vernimmen, 2005). This implies for some cases a debt close to 0, and consequently
a disproportionate apparent interest rate. Descriptive statistics of the ¯nal database used
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Means Standard Number of
deviations observations
K 2669.137 8619.896 2983
P 500.577 1598.459 2982
Y 1400.389 3039.6 2533
L=(L + OF) 0.176 3.324 2977
L=OF 0.550 2.063 2978
L¡1=P 1.381 6.064 2849
L=K¡1 0.202 1.582 2711
ROE 0.189 0.434 2884
r 0.043 0.343 2885
Ee 469.438 1671.309 2982
E 813.202 3202.036 2982
Notes: The ¯rst column reports sample means. Standard
deviations are in second columns. The studied period is
1989-2007.
The data used come either from balance sheets or of the income statement of the
groups. We do not use the data coming from the cash-°ow statements in this study be-
cause of the rules according to which they are developed. Indeed, the cash-°ow statements
gather only the operations giving indeed place to a °ow of funds. For example, any Merger
or Acquisition ¯nanced by equity issuance will be eliminated from this kind of account.
This is why, regardless investment and ¯nancing °ows, these tests are made from variation
of balance sheet. It is thus the case in particular for the estimate of productive invest-
ment, carried out starting from the variations of the tangible capital stock Kc, or for the
estimates about share issuance (variations of the stock of issued equities E).





































9Table 2: Determination of the variables and correspondences with World-
scope database
Variable Corresponding Worldscope Data
K 02501 Property plant and equipment - Net + 02652 Total Other
assets - 02648 Other assets
Kc 02501 Property plant and equipment - Net
Ki 02652 Total Other assets - 02648 Other assets
P 07240 Net Sales or Revenues
+ 01051 Cost Of Goods Sold
- 01101 Selling, General and Administrative Expenses
- 01020 Other Operating Expenses
Y P
+ 01084 Sta® Costs
L - 02001 Cash and Short term Investment
+ 03051 Short term Debt and Current portion of long term debt
+ 03251 Total Long Term Debt
+ 18183 Deferred Taxes Credit + 03273 Other Liabilities
OF 03480 Common Stock + 03481 Capital Surplus + (03493 Other
Appropriated Reserves + 03497 Unrealized Foreign Exchange
Gain/Loss) + 03495 Retained Earnings + 03499 Treasury Stock +
03401 Non Equity Reserves + 03061 Dividends Payable + 03260
Provision for risk and charge + 03426 Minority Interest + 03451
Preferred Stock
ROE (P - 01151 Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization Expenses -
01149 Amortization Of Intangible - 01701 Preferred Dividend
Requirements + 01253 Extraordinary Credit Pretax + 01262 Other
Income/Expenses Net - 01254 Extraordinary Charge Pretax - 01301
Reserves Increase/Decrease + 01505 Discontinued Operations +
01503 Equity In Earnings + 01267 Pretax Equity In Earnings +
01601 Extraordinary Items & Gain/Loss Sale Of Assets + 01504 After
Taxes Other Incomes Or Expenses) / FP
r (01251 Interest Expense On Debt - (01016 Interest Income + 01255
Interest Capitalized))/L
Ee 02256 Investment in Unconsolidated Subsidiaries + 02250
Other Investments
+ 02258 Long Term Receivables + 02648 Other assets
E 03480 Common Stock + 03481 Capital Surplus
Notes: In right column are presented the corresponding Worldscope items and the
associated number.
tively Kc and Ki), in order to take into account one of the characteristics of the group
accounts. Indeed, in consolidated accounts, when Merger and Acquisition operations arise,
the new entity acquired by the group is integrated (overall or not) in the perimeter of this
one. In other words, a goodwill is recorded on the asset side, i.e. the di®erence between





































9between the estimated fair value of assets and liabilities except for common stock, bal-
anced by the quota of the company acquired by the parent company (Bachy & Sion [2005];
Colinet & Paoli [2005]). This goodwill is recorded in the intangible assets item, as this last
element takes a very di®erent signi¯cation from the notion of intangible assets within the
meaning of national accounting (Depoutot, 2002). The intangible capital is thus used here
as a proxy for external growth activities, supposed as being mainly ¯nanced by the issue
of shares. The correspondence between all variables used in this work and the worldscope
database are presented in Table 2.
4 Tests Results
4.1 Productive Investment
Table 3 presents the results of the estimates of the investment equations, based on the
equation (7). The equations (a) and (b) are directly derived from this last. The assump-
tion of a pro¯t accelerator seems checked since the coe±cient connecting the variation of
the gross pro¯t and the capital accumulation is very signi¯cant. It is worth noting that
the variation of ¯nancial pro¯tability of the ¯rms in°uences negatively the investment,
which thus tends to con¯rm the thesis according to which the impact of ¯nance on ¯rms'
activities acts through it.
By seeking an increase in ¯nancial pro¯tability for the shareholders, the ¯rms exert an
increasing pressure on the cost of the capital, which weighs negatively on the investment.
The pursuit for a strong and positive ¯nancial leverage e®ect to satisfy the shareholder
requirements about "good practices of management" leads also them to increase their
debt, which generates an other side of the ¯nancial constraint on the investment. Indeed,
this led in particular the groups to an increasing risk (Kalecki's principle of increasing risk)
because this increase of debt ratio might induce ¯nancial fragility. One can then explain
the negative link between the solvency ratio and investment. Lastly, the variations of





































9Table 3: Alternative speci¯cations of productive investment's determinants
Dependant (a) with (b) with (c) with
variable: (a) sectorial (b) sectorial (c) sectorial








(0.047) (0.047) (0.068) (0.069)
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Number of ¯rms 207 207 189 189 208 208
Sample size 1896 1896 1410 1410 2029 2029
m2 1.28 1.29 1.56 1.57 1.59 1.60
(critical prob.) (0.199) (0.196) (0.118) (0.116) (0.112) (0.110)
J(p ¡ value) 120.51 120.52 106.25 102.75 125.25 126.53
(critical prob.) (0.143) (0.143) (0.367) (0.461) (0.067) (0.058)
Notes: The ¯gures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. m2 corre-
sponds to the Arellano & Bond test for second-order serial correlation under the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation. The J-statistic corresponds to the Hansen test of the
overidentifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Concerning
Eq(a), ¢Log P is lagged one and two times,L¡1=P one to four times and ¢Log ROE one
time. In (b), ¢Log P is lagged from one to four times, ¢Log ROE one time and ¢Log r
from one and two times. In (c), ¢Log Y is lagged from one to four times and L¡1=P from
one to three times. For each speci¯cation, a second equation is proposed, with sectorial
dummies. The sicj variables correspond to the sectors considered by the SIC classi¯ca-
tion (sic1 is the reference sector and sic6 is not introduced because it corresponds to the
¯nancial sector).
¤Indicates signi¯cance at the 1% level.
¤¤Indicates signi¯cance at the
5% level.





































9principle of arbitrage between liquidity preference and investment in ¯xed assets. The
equation (c) is an alternative formulation of the investment equation with a demand-
accelerator close to Samuelson's one. The J and m2 statistics point respectively that the
instruments are valid and that the serial correlation of the residuals is excluded. These
GMM models seem thus acceptable.
Table 4: Alternative speci¯cations of ¯nancial investment's
determinants
Dependant (d) with (e) with
variable: (d) sectorial (e) sectorial




























































Number of ¯rms 199 199 209 209
Sample size 1738 1738 2049 2049
m2 -1.52 -1.52 -1.55 -1.51
(critical prob.) (0.128) (0.128) (0.121) (0.132)
J(p ¡ value) 34.42 33.79 60.49 57.41
(critical prob.) (0.849) (0.867) (0.831) (0.534)
Notes: In Equation (d), Log r is lagged from one to three times. In
Eq(e), Log ROE¡1 is lagged from one to four times and ¢(L=(L +
OF)) one time.
¤Indicates signi¯cance at the 1% level.
¤¤Indicates
signi¯cance at the 5% level.






































Table 4 shows in particular the role of the return of various ¯nancial assets in ¯rm's
¯nancial investments, except for Merger and Acquisition. These investments correspond
in a great portion to ¯nancial assets acquisitions in terms of minority interests, i.e. which
cannot be consolidated. One then notes the importance of the increasing pressure on the
¯nancial pro¯tability of the ¯rms, exerted by shareholding. Indeed, the trend of apparent
interest rate impacts negatively the ¯nancial investment. One can deduce from it that
con¯rms the idea of a negative impact of a ¯nancing cost, but that this is also a strong
support to the hypothesis of the pursuit for a positive leverage e®ect (cf. equation (d)).
The ¯rms which wish to be involved in debt to increase the common equity return, via the
return of the bought equities, do it all the less since the debt cost is strong. Consequently,
the rise of the debt ratio is positively connected to ¯nancial accumulation (Equation
(e)), as a ¯nancing source for this kind of activities. Lastly, an upward trend of ¯nancial
pro¯tability logically implies an increase in ¯nancial accumulation since the return of this
kind of asset increases. The coe±cient is positive, as expected. There still, the J and m2
statistics result in validating the GMM models.
4.3 Indebtedness Function
Concerning the equations of debt, one ¯nds still the expected results (Table 5). The
two equations (equation (f) and equation (g)) show a negative link between the variation
of apparent interest rates and the debt. In addition, they show also the positive role played
by the trend of ¯nancial pro¯tability. Thus, with the arrival of ¯nancialised capitalism, the
considerable level of ¯nancial pro¯tability required by the shareholders and, in addition,
actually observed (Plihon [2002]; du Tertre & Guy [2008]), generates for the ¯rms a clear
tendency to exploit the leverage e®ect via an increase in debt leverage stricto sensu, namely
L
OF .
Lastly, the debt ¯nances the whole ¯xed assets K (tangible and intangible), one thus
obtains a positive relation between the stock of ¯xed assets and the debt ratio tested.





































9Table 5: Alternative speci¯cations of indebtedness equa-
tions
Dependant (f) with (g) with
































































Number of ¯rms 202 202 202 202
Sample size 1743 1743 1750 1750
m2 -0.74 -1.09 -0.73 -1.08
(critical prob.) (0.462) (0.277) (0.465) (0.281)
J(p ¡ value) 118.04 120.96 85.60 80.76
(critical prob.) (0.354) (0.287) (0.131) (0.224)
Notes: In (f), LogK is lagged from one to four times, and
Log ROE¡1 is lagged one time and ¢r¡1 from one to three times.
In (g), Log ROE¡1 is lagged one time, and LogK from one to four
times.
¤Indicates signi¯cance at the 1% level.
¤¤Indicates signi¯-
cance at the 5% level.
¤¤¤Indicates signi¯cance at the 10% level.
elements. The J and m2 statistics fail to reject the null assumptions of overidentifying of
the variables and of autocorrelation of the residuals, the models are consequently accepted.
4.4 Equity issuing





































9Table 6: Alternative speci¯cations of equity issuing
Dependant (h) with (i) with
variable: (h) sectorial (i) sectorial


























































Number of ¯rms 212 212 208 208
Sample size 2484 2484 2227 2227
m2 0.87 0.89 1.24 1.26
(critical prob.) (0.462) (0.277) (0.216) (0.208)
J(p ¡ value) 54.06 52.03 47.24 46.84
(critical prob.) (0.142) (0.190) (0.216) (0.281)
Notes: In (h), Log Ki is lagged from one to three times. In
(i), Log Ki is lagged once and (L=K)¡1 is lagged from one to
two times.
¤Indicates signi¯cance at the 1% level.
¤¤Indicates
signi¯cance at the 5% level.
¤¤¤Indicates signi¯cance at the 10%
level.
assumptions of the equation (10). First of all, a debt growing led the ¯rms to increase
their ¯nancing by equities, i.e. in order to limit the debt ratio during consequent Merger
and Acquisition periods, in spite of the objectives of high ROE, and because of the huge
needs for funds. Then, the issues of shares meet certainly the ¯nancing need of capital
accumulation, but we highlight here in particular the ¯nancing of the intangible capital.
In their model, starting from the Kaldor's equation (1966), Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002)





































9the period. They specify however that this formulation seems to them far too simplifying.
Following Toporowski (2000) or Lordon (2008), we work on the assumption that these are
Mergers and Acquisitions, i.e. operations of external growth, which are mainly ¯nanced
by issue of shares. Through the consolidated balance-sheets, the means of testing such
a relation, as explained above, is to retain as a substitute variable the accumulation of
goodwill, itself recorded in intangible assets item. The coe±cient obtained is positive and
very signi¯cant. The J and m2 statistics lead us to validate once more the models.
Conclusion
The return of Financial power has thus very clear consequences on the ¯nancialisation
of the companies' strategies, whether it concerns their investment plans or their ¯nancing
decisions. The ¯rms, and in particular the great quoted groups, must ful¯l the requirements
of ¯nancial return established by convention on ¯nancial markets. We wished to check these
assertions, based on post-Keynesian and Regulationnists assumptions, starting from the
consolidated accounts of groups which are member of the SBF250 French Index. These
accounts and the resulting tests bring new lessons, compared to the studies on French ¯rms
usually carried out from the national accounts of INSEE, as well as con¯rmations. They
make it possible to check that the norms of ¯nancial pro¯tability have e®ectively a negative
impact on productive investment for these groups, as well as the very positive impact of
these norms through ¯nancial leverage on ¯nancial investment and debt. This con¯rms the
reality of an endogenous ¯nancial fragility in period of strong expansion. Lastly, these tests
allow showing that the issues of shares respond to two particular constraints: to ¯nance
the external growth considered as necessary to a fast increase in ¯nancial pro¯tability, and
to limit indebtedness when it grows in such way that a risk of insolvency could appear.
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Annex - The Standard Industrial Classi¯cation used in World-
scope
Table 7: SIC Codes used in the tests and de¯nitions
SIC Code Corresponding Sector Number of
groups
sic0 Agriculture and Fishing 1 group
sic1 Mining Industry 11 groups
sic2 Building 41 groups
sic3 Industry 49 groups
sic4 Transportation and Communication 28 groups
sic5 Trade 30 groups
sic7 Other Services 38 groups
sic8 Health Services 15 groups
sic9 Public Administration 2 groups
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